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Abstract: 
In this comment, we contrast different conceptions of mind wandering that were presented in 2 recent 
theoretical reviews: Smallwood and Schooler (2006) and Watkins (2008). We also introduce a new perspective 
on the role of executive control in mind wandering by integrating empirical evidence presented in Smallwood 
and Schooler with 2 theoretical frameworks: Watkins’s elaborated control theory and Klinger’s (1971, 2009) 
current concerns theory. In contrast to the Smallwood–Schooler claim that mind wandering recruits executive 
resources, we argue that mind wandering represents a failure of executive control and that it is dually 
determined by the presence of automatically generated thoughts in response to environmental and mental cues 
and the ability of the executive-control system to deal with this interference. We present empirical support for 
this view from experimental, neuroimaging, and individual-differences research. 
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Article: 
Two theoretical reviews of the mind-wandering literature have been published recently in Psychological 
Bulletin. The first was Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) ―The Restless Mind,‖ which argued, based on 
experimental, nomothetic research, that mind wandering consumes executive resources, drawing them away 
from one’s primary task in the absence of effective metacognitive monitoring. The second was Watkins’s 
(2008) ―Constructive and Unconstructive Repetitive Thought,‖ which presented a model to explain idiographic 
data from laboratory, field, and clinical studies on the consequences of repetitive thought. Both reviews 
deservedly draw attention to the understudied topic of thought content and its potential effects on task 
performance and the development of psychopathology. Moreover, their contrasting views provide an 
opportunity to consider the broad relevance of thought content to theories of executive function. In this 
comment, we point out the subtly— but significantly— different conceptions of mind wandering and control 
presented in these articles and we describe our own view on how to reconcile them. We focus primarily on the 
class of repetitive thought called mind wandering, defined as off-task thoughts during an ongoing task or 
activity. Moreover, like Watkins, our view relies heavily on findings from individual-differences research, 
findings that we believe pose problems for the Smallwood–Schooler executive-resource theory. 
 
We first outline the view of executive resources and mind wandering presented by Smallwood and Schooler 
(2006) and then focus on the key theoretical point introduced by Watkins (2008). We ultimately introduce an 
extension of Watkins’s claims with new evidence for the role of executive-control failures in producing mind-
wandering experiences, along with a new perspective on the evidence offered by Smallwood and Schooler. The 
main difference between our perspective and that of Smallwood and Schooler concerns the relation between 
mind wandering and executive resources: They argued that mind wandering requires executive resources, 
whereas we argue that mind wandering results from executive-control failure. Most experimental research on 
mind wandering can be readily interpreted from either of our perspectives, but subtle differences between our 
views yield contradictory predictions about individual differences in mind-wandering susceptibility. 
 
“The Restless Mind” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) 
In their separate and collaborative work, Smallwood and Schooler have revitalized the laboratory approach to 
mind-wandering research (e.g., Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 
2007, 2008; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003), which had yielded few influential findings since the early 
1990s. Their 2006 article comprehensively reviewed the growing experimental literature on mind wandering 
and rightly emphasized, in our view, the importance of understanding off-task thought to basic-science research 
into consciousness, metacognition, attention, and executive control. At the same time, we suggest that their 
theoretical claim about the relation between mind wandering and executive functions, although plausible, can be 
contrasted with a better alternative. The fundamental claim in question is whether or not mind wandering 
requires (i.e., consumes) executive resources (see also Smallwood et al., 2007). 
 
Mind wandering varies as a function of task difficulty, and Smallwood and Schooler (2006) interpreted this 
finding as an executive resource trade-off between performing the task and engaging in task-unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs). Mind wandering de-creases, for example, as stimulus presentation rates increase in vigilance tasks 
(Antrobus, 1968; Giambra, 1995; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990–1991) and as memory load, or other aspects of 
task difficulty, increase (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Filler & Giambra, 1973; Forster & Lavie, 2009; 
McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006; Stuvyen, & van der Gouten, 1995; Teasdale, Lloyd, Proctor, 
& Baddeley, 1993). Furthermore, TUTs increase with practice on the primary task (Mason et al., 2007; 
Teasdale et al., 1995): Practice allows for automatization, which diminishes resource demands and so, 
Smallwood and Schooler argued, more executive resources remain available for mind wandering. Moreover, 
Smallwood and Schooler emphasized that task performance often suffers when people engage in mind 
wandering, as if TUTs draw attentional resources away from the task (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; Schooler et 
al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2004, 2007, 2003). Teasdale et al. (1995) found, for example, that subjects 
generated less random, more stereotyped number sequences in a random-number-generation task when they 
were mind wandering than when they were on task. Performance on the primary task suffered when subjects 
reported mind wandering consistent with the claim that mind wandering draws on executive resources that 
would otherwise be used to perform the task (e.g., Baddeley, 1986). 
 
Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) nuanced view of the resource balance between mind wandering and 
performance is that TUTs predict poor performance only on primary tasks that require an intermediate degree of 
controlled processing and metacognitive monitoring. When task demands are low, resources are simultaneously 
available for mind wandering and self-monitoring; thus, TUTs can be stopped when they are detected. When 
task demands are high, few resources are available for either monitoring or mind wandering. It is only during 
moderately demanding tasks that resources may be split between performance and mind wandering, but without 
enough devoted to monitoring. The consequence, then, is that mind wandering may go undetected, leading to 
performance errors. According to their view, mind wandering is automatic on some dimensions but not on 
others (see Bargh, 1994): It occurs unintentionally and sometimes without awareness, but it also demands 
limited resources. Based on this view, mind wandering consumes the same resources, or uses the same 
mechanisms, that are responsible for executive control. Smallwood and Schooler, in later work, further 
suggested a ―processing overlap with the brain’s executive system,‖ thereby arguing that the same mechanisms 
that are engaged by the task are diverted to produce the content of mind-wandering episodes (Christoff, Gordon, 
Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009, p. 5). 
 
Smallwood and Schooler (2006) recognized that their view of mind wandering as a resource-demanding 
phenomenon is paradoxical: Mind wandering reflects controlled processing, insofar as it demands resources, yet 
it is often unintentional. The paradox arises because intention is central to most characterizations of cognitive 
control (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Posner & Snyder, 1975). To contend with the paradox, Smallwood and 
Schooler introduced two further, critical ideas: (a) subjects’ goals (and thoughts thereof) can be triggered 
automatically by salient cues, a point made compellingly by Klinger’s extensive research on fantasy and 
thought flow (e.g., Klinger, 1971, 2009, 1999) and; (b) consciousness and metaconsciousness are discrete 
mental states (Schooler, 2002), in that a reader may be momentarily unaware of her own conscious experiences, 
as when a reader finds herself having moved her eyes over a page of text while thinking about something else. 
Thus, ―mind wandering can occur against our best intentions because the automatic activation of a personally 
relevant, but task-unrelated, goal has temporarily drawn our attention away from the primary task‖ (Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2006, p. 953). Smallwood and Schooler further argued that, following the priming of a mind-
wandering episode, resources are required to maintain the TUT. 
 
We agree that mind wandering is often automatically activated, as Smallwood and Schooler (2006) suggested, 
but we suggest that TUTs do not draw on executive resources nor do they rely on the same cognitive 
mechanisms that are used for executive control. Rather, we propose that mind wandering reflects a failure of the 
executive-control system to adequately combat interfering thoughts that are generated and maintained 
automatically (i.e., unintentionally and without consuming executive resources but potentially controllable; 
Bargh, 1994). We turn now to Watkins (2008), who similarly relied on the concept of an executive-control 
system to explain the regulation of conscious thought. 
 
“Constructive and Unconstructive Repetitive Thought” (Watkins, 2008) 
In his review, Watkins (2008) proposed a control-theory approach to understanding the consequences of 
repetitive thought (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). He argued that repetitive thought arises as output from a 
feedback loop involved in evaluating discrepancies between the end state of goals and their current status. At 
any given time, a hierarchy of goals guides one’s behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1999). Control theory states that 
repetitive thought will be constructive (e.g., acceptance and growth following a personal tragedy) when it aids a 
person in resolving the discrepancy and moving toward the desired state (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996), 
and it will be unconstructive (e.g., exacerbating depressive symptoms) when an unattainable goal has not yet 
been abandoned. 
 
Klinger (e.g., 1971, 2009) has argued that, as goals are established, they become current concerns and are kept 
especially accessible until they are resolved or abandoned. These current concerns may be cued by the 
environment (or by other thoughts). When this occurs, concern-related thoughts at various levels within the 
hierarchy compete for attention. From a cognitive-control perspective, the admittance of current concerns into 
awareness must be regulated in a top-down manner, at least in some contexts, so that environmental cues are not 
unopposed in their influence on thought content. Watkins (2008) posited that momentary constraints placed on 
the level of construal, or the concreteness of goals, helps to regulate thought content. A concrete level of 
construal focuses on the specific task goal and the particular behaviors to complete the goal (e.g., bending one’s 
knees when setting up a basketball free throw), whereas an abstract level of construal allows thoughts about 
higher order goals (e.g., getting a basketball scholarship to college). The level of construal for optimal 
performance depends on the task and contextual variables (see action identification theory; Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1987). 
 
The proposal that goals can be construed at different levels is of particular relevance to our perspective on mind 
wandering. A concrete level of construal is required for optimal functioning in novel or difficult tasks (see also 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), whereas a more abstract level of construal can occur during an easy task with little 
or no influence on performance. For example, during a difficult puzzle, only information related to the goal of 
solving the puzzle should be admitted into awareness. In contrast, during a leisurely drive across town, when the 
task of controlling the car is highly automatic, information related to higher order abstract goals can occupy 
attention without significant cost to driving (e.g., making a good impression by arriving on time to an 
appointment). Watkins’s (2008) view is that the adoption of a more concrete than abstract level of construal 
allows for a sharper focus on the specific means for accomplishing the goal. 
 
According to Watkins (2008), one’s level of construal is jointly affected by the extent to which goal progress is 
possible, by self-related beliefs (e.g., self-esteem), by mood, and by executive-control capability. We focus 
specifically on Watkins’s perspective that executive control is necessary to match the level of construal to the 
demands of the situation. Watkins’s view is not a theory of mind wandering, per se, but it can contribute to 
researchers’ understanding of executive control and TUTs. Executive resources limit the type of information 
that gains entry into awareness, depending on the demands of the task (i.e., matching the level of construal to 
the situational demands). Thus, elaborated control theory predicts that a person with limited executive-control 
capabilities, relative to someone with greater capabilities, will be less able to implement the proper level of 
construal for the task or activity at hand; consequently, he or she will experience more repetitive, off-task 
thoughts (or mind wandering), resulting in poor performance on the primary task. This idiographic prediction is 
contrary to the one that would be generated from the executive-demand view of mind wandering (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006; we have more to say about this later). Our claim, consistent with elaborated control theory, is 
that executive control is engaged to prevent mind wandering and that variation in executive control (both inter- 
and intraindividual) partially determines the intrusion of TUTs into conscious experience. 
 
Implicit in Watkins’s (2008) approach is the continued existence of discrepancies (i.e., current concerns) at all 
levels of the goal hierarchy that, when activated by cues, may trigger mind wandering (e.g., Klinger, 1971, 
1999). Goal evaluation (i.e., comparing the desired state to the end state and updating goals) is continuous and 
generates a stream of thoughts, outside of awareness, that compete for attention. The entry of these thoughts 
into awareness is moderated by control over the level of construal (i.e., control over whether thoughts are about 
immediate task demands or about more abstract, high-level goals). From this perspective, off-task thoughts do 
not consume executive resources; rather, executive processes control the types of thoughts that gain entry into 
awareness. We suggest that an abstract level of construal (i.e., letting thoughts about higher order goals flow in 
an uncontrolled manner) is the default mode of processing (see also Vallacher & Wegner, 1987); control 
mechanisms are initiated to constrain the level of construal and to allow thoughts into awareness only when 
they are appropriately related to the immediate task goal. We suggest, also, that an abstract level of construal 
allows for a large network of related concepts to be activated, increasing the number of off-task thoughts that 
are likely to be generated, thereby increasing the probability of a mind-wandering episode (see our Control 
Failures X Concerns perspective below). 
 
The idea that mind wandering content is continuously, automatically, and unintentionally generated in a 
resource-free manner (i.e., that it represents a default state of mind) is consistent with Watkins’s (2008) 
elaborated control theory and Klinger’s (1971, 2009) current concerns theory. It contrasts sharply, however, 
with Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) view that mind wandering is resource demanding.1 
 
A Control Failure X Concerns Perspective on Mind Wandering and Executive Control 
The developmental continuity of fantasy and early play together with the diurnal continuity of 
fantasy and dreams suggests that they all form phases of a common continuous stream of 
activity, a kind of baseline activity to which organisms return when not engaged in scanning or 
acting upon their environment. The particular structural characteristics of this baseline activity 
are determined by the physiological and developmental context in which it occurs. (Klinger, 197 
1, pp.347–348) 
 
Does mind wandering require executive resources? Smallwood and Schooler (2006) claimed that it does: ―If the 
primary task requires the individual to maintain and coordinate task-relevant information in awareness, then few 
resources will be available to coordinate a mind-wandering episode‖ (p. 949). In contrast, we conceive of mind 
wandering as resulting from a failure of executive control over automatically (and continuously) cued thoughts, 
rather than as consuming executive resources. The two perspectives seem similar, and indeed they might 
account for the majority of relevant empirical data equally well. However, our view accounts for several 
empirical findings that the Smallwood–Schooler view does not, including experimental effects of fatigue and 
alcohol on mind wandering and many individual-differences findings. Below we outline our Control Failure X 
Concerns perspective on mind wandering and then reexamine evidence for a resource-demanding view 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) according to our perspective. 
 
Executive Control, Interference, and Goal Maintenance 
Mind wandering occurs during attention-demanding tasks when control processes are insufficient to deal with 
the interference created by off-task thoughts. Unlike Smallwood and Schooler (2006), we do not believe that 
mind wandering draws on the same executive resources or mechanisms as executive control, but rather that 
mind wandering can be controlled or prevented using the executive-control system and that mind-wandering 
episodes reflect failures of the control system (potentially due to the unavailability of executive resources for 
proper thought control). According to our view, mind wandering is prevented when control is proactively 
initiated and maintained in response to task demands (i.e., when the appropriate level of construal is applied) or 
when control is reactively initiated to block or suppress TUTs as they are activated in response to cues. These 
two components of executive control (i.e., proactive and reactive) are dissociable using behavioral measures 
and in their association with different brain areas, in particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), respectively (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Braver, 
Gray, & Burgess, 2007; J. W. Brown & Braver, 2005; Engle & Kane, 2004). 
 
Kane and Engle (2003) distinguished individual differences in goal maintenance (a form of proactive control) 
from competition resolution (a form of reactive control) in a Stroop task. They found that people who varied in 
working memory capacity (WMC), which is broadly associated with executive-control capabilities (e.g., Engle 
& Kane, 2004), differed in their ability to (a) proactively maintain accessibility of the task goal (color naming) 
throughout the task and (b) reactively resolve the competition evoked, in the moment, from incongruent color–
word stimuli. In a Stroop task consisting of mostly congruent trials (i.e., most words presented in matching 
colors such as RED in red), low-WMC subjects committed more errors on rare incongruent trials (e.g., BLUE in 
red) and showed greater reaction time facilitation on congruent trials. This pattern suggests that low-WMC 
subjects frequently reverted to the habit of reading words rather than naming their colors (i.e., inadequately 
maintaining access to the task goal). Moreover, low-WMC subjects were slower to respond than high-WMC 
subjects even in contexts that better reinforced the task goals and even when low-WMC subjects responded 
correctly on incongruent trials; low-WMC subjects appeared deficient in reactively resolving color–word 
conflict, even when the task goal was accessible enough to prevent overt errors. 
 
The proactive and reactive components of executive control are associated with PFC and ACC, respectively, 
based on sustained neural activity in response to initial task demands (proactive initiation) and on more 
punctuated activity in response to immediate conflict within the task (reactive initiation; Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Braver et al., 2007). Although PFC and ACC most clearly contribute to the control of behavior (i.e., to task 
performance), these regions may also help control thought. Mitchell et al. (2007), for example, examined the 
effects of proactive and reactive control in thought regulation, specifically in attempting to not think about a 
white bear. Subjects showed a proactive, sustained increase in PFC activity as they tried to suppress the thought, 
and they showed more transient, tonic ACC activity in reaction to actually thinking about a white bear. These 
findings should also generalize to situations in which subjects attempt to constrain their thoughts to specific 
goals concerning the current task (i.e., to maintain a concrete level of construal) instead of suppressing a 
particular thought, especially when that task is novel or difficult. That is, PFC activity should reflect proactive 
attempts to maintain a de-sired train of thought, whereas ACC activity should mark occasions on which 
proactive control failed and interference arose from a competing thought stream (see, e.g., MacDonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000). 
 
Reexamining the Evidence From Smallwood and Schooler (2006) 
The evidence cited by Smallwood and Schooler (2006) regarding their claim that mind wandering requires 
executive resources can be reinterpreted in light of our view that mind wandering represents a failure of 
executive control. For example, we argue that the decrease in mind wandering that accompanies increases in 
task demands (e.g., stimulus presentation rate or memory load) reflects the initiation of controlled processing to 
block interfering, off-task thoughts, instead of a division of executive resources between behavior and thought. 
That is, some tasks do not require much executive control or they may no longer require it after significant 
practice. Therefore, the content of conscious thought does not need to be regulated or constrained to the specific 
task goals and an abstract level of construal is allowed. In contrast, both mind wandering and distraction-based 
performance errors during difficult tasks can be attributed to the failure to proactively maintain mental access to 
the necessary task goals in the face of interference. For example, Teasdale et al. (1995) found that performance 
deficits in random-number generation accompanied mind wandering. This finding may indicate momentary 
disruptions of the control system rather than a consistent division of resources between mind wandering and 
generating numbers. 
 
We thus suggest, more generally, that the inverse relation between task demands and mind wandering may 
result from the proactive initiation of executive control in response to task demands. A difficult or novel task 
initiates a greater degree of controlled processing (and a more concrete level of construal; Watkins, 2008) than 
does an easy or practiced task. Executive-control processes, then, are elicited that defend against interfering, 
off-task thoughts. 
 
Although our alternate proposal regarding load and practice effects may explain the task-demand and practice 
findings no better than does the Smallwood and Schooler (2006) view, we claim that it provides a better account 
of other findings. The experimental, nonidiographic findings that are most difficult to reconcile with the 
Smallwood and Schooler (2006) view are that TUTs increase with fatigue (e.g., Antrobus, Coleman, & Singer, 
1967; Antrobus et al., 1966; McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, Heim, Riby, & Davies, 
2005; Teasdale et al., 1995) and with alcohol consumption (Finnigan, Schulze, & Smallwood, 2007; Sayette, 
Reichle, & Schooler, 2009). If executive resources are depleted via demanding tasks or alcohol (e.g., Muraven 
& Baumeister, 2000; Steele & Josephs, 1988), and if mind wandering requires such resources, then TUTs 
should diminish with sufficient fatigue or inebriation. If, however, as we argue, mind wandering results from 
control-system failures, then more failures—and more mind wandering—should occur as executive control 
becomes fatigued or impaired by alcohol. 
 
Individual Differences in Mind Wandering and Executive Control 
Individual differences in executive capabilities, or in initiating proactive or reactive control processes in the face 
of interference, should—and do—predict the propensity to mind wander across contexts. We suggest that recent 
work examining variation in WMC and mind wandering conflicts with Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) claim 
that mind wandering consumes executive re-sources. If TUTs demanded these resources, then individuals with 
more resources at their disposal (e.g., high-WMC individuals) should mind wander more often than do those 
with fewer resources. That is, high-WMC individuals compared to low-WMC individuals are likely to have 
resources beyond those that are needed for task completion; they should thus have the propensity to mind 
wander more. However, consistent with the elaborated control theory (Watkins, 2008), we have found the 
opposite pattern. People with high WMC, who show superior executive control across many tasks (Engle & 
Kane, 2004), report less frequent mind wandering during attention-demanding activities than do low-WMC 
individuals, both in and out of the laboratory (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009). Furthermore, a second 
idiographic prediction follows from Smallwood and Schooler’s view of mind wandering. When high-WMC 
subjects mind wander, their task performance should be less affected than that of low-WMC subjects, because 
high-WMC subjects will have the resources to split resources between off-task thoughts and performance. 
However, we reexamined data from McVay and Kane (2009) and found that WMC does not affect the relation 
between mind wandering and performance: Subjects were less accurate on trials in which they reported off-task 
thoughts, irrespective of WMC. 
 
Individual differences in psychopathological symptoms, which often covary with executive capabilities, also 
appear to affect the maintenance of on-task thoughts amid interference from off-task thoughts. As one might 
expect, research demonstrates an empirical connection between mind wandering and attention-deficit/ 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a condition associated with inattentiveness and with deficits on many 
executive-function tasks (e.g., Barkley, 1997; Karatekin, 2004; Shallice et al., 2002). Shaw and Giambra (1993) 
administered a vigilance task to a group of adults who had been diagnosed with ADHD in childhood and to a 
group of healthy controls. Subjects with ADHD reported a higher frequency of TUTs during the vigilance task 
(Ms = 83% and 67%, respectively), inconsistent with a resource-demanding view of mind wandering. Intrusive 
thoughts and rumination are also part of the diagnostic criteria for several mood disorders, including depression. 
Smallwood, O’Connor, and Heim (2006) demonstrated a strong, positive relation between dysphoria (i.e., 
subclinical depression) and TUT rates (r = .61) during a word-fragment-completion task. Thus, mild depression 
was associated with in-creased ruminative thought. According to Smallwood and Schooler (2006), high rates of 
mind wandering should be associated with high capacity, but there is no theoretical reason for depression or 
ADHD to increase executive resources. Rather, these psychopathologies are thought to be associated with 
failures of executive control. 
 
As far as we are aware, the only idiographic finding that may pose difficulty for our view of mind wandering is 
that older adults report less mind wandering than do younger adults, both via retrospective questionnaires (e.g., 
Giambra, 1977–1978, 1979– 1980) and via in-the-moment thought reports during ongoing tasks (Giambra, 
1989, 1993). These findings are surprising from the perspective that older adults exhibit considerable executive-
control deficits relative to young adults (for review, see Braver & West, 2008). They also seem contrary to our 
claim that subjects who exhibit executive-control deficits should also show high mind-wandering rates. We 
suggest an alternative explanation, however, based on the logic of current concerns theory (Klinger, 1971, 1999, 
2009). That is, mind wandering is determined by two factors: executive-control capabilities and the extent to 
which interfering thoughts are cued and automatically generated in the moment. Consider an analogy with 
Stroop task performance. Color naming is faster and more accurate when the color carrier is a neutral letter 
string (e.g., XXXX in red) than when it is a conflicting color word (e.g., BLUE in red); it may also be easier to 
sustain attention to an activity when there are relatively few interfering, off-task thoughts triggered by the task 
environment. 
 
According to this Control Failure X Concerns view, predictions about individual differences in mind wandering 
must consider people’s control capabilities, the number and significance of their current life concerns, and the 
likelihood that the prevailing context will prime those concerns (Klinger, 197 1). Antrobus and colleagues 
(1966) made a similar point empirically by presenting personally relevant information to subjects directly 
before assessing their TUTs during a vigilance task. Half the young-adult subjects heard a contrived (but 
realistic) radio broadcast about an escalation of the Vietnam War while they waited to participate in the 
experiment. Not surprisingly, these subjects subsequently reported more TUTs than did control subjects during 
the vigilance task. According to our view, the increase in mind wandering occurred because the news increased 
subjects’ baseline thought production by triggering attempts to assimilate the new information (information in 
the radio broadcast) with their life goals. Similar findings have been reported by Horowitz and colleagues (e.g., 
Horowitz & Becker, 197 1; Horowitz, Becker, & Moskowitz, 197 1), who experimentally increased subjects’ 
TUT rates by showing them an unpleasant, stressful film beforehand, and by Klos and Singer (1981), who 
manipulated their young-adult subjects’ thoughts by having them first simulate a coercive or a collaborative 
interaction with one of their parents. 
 
Returning to mind wandering in adult aging, then, we may reinterpret age differences in TUTs. Older adults 
may generate fewer interfering thoughts than do younger adults because they have fewer goals and a different 
goal hierarchy (e.g., more relationship-oriented goals; Carstensen, 1993, 1995). Indeed, Parks, Klinger, and 
Perlmutter (1988 – 89) found that older adults endorsed fewer current concerns than did younger adults. This 
suggests that typical older subjects arrive at the laboratory with fewer life concerns to potentially interfere with 
their task-relevant thoughts. Moreover, older adults may be less likely than younger adults to have any concern-
related TUTs triggered by the laboratory context, even if the groups have the same number and urgency of 
concerns: The environment of most laboratories (e.g., computers, young research assistants, university 
buildings) simply presents more salient cues to the concerns of younger than older adults (see Klinger, 1999). 
 
Finally, a separate category of thought needs further attention in cognitive-aging work: task-related interference 
(TRI; Smallwood et al., 2006), the interference that can arise when people’s thoughts turn to evaluating their 
task performance. These thoughts may be task-related, in a sense, but they are often detrimental to performance 
(see Beilock, 2008; Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996). Watkins (2008) used the example of a basketball player 
who attempts to sink a free throw. A novice is more likely to make the shot if he or she focuses on the 
mechanics of shooting, rather than focusing on the consequences of missing (e.g., losing the game). This latter 
type of thought reflects a poorly modulated level of construal, in that interfering thoughts are task related but do 
not aid performance as would a more concrete construal. We suspect that older adults often experience 
excessive thoughts about their lab-task performance and about how they may compare to younger adults as a 
consequence of fears and biases associated with cognitive aging (i.e., stereotype threat; Hess, Auman, 
Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003). Giambra’s (1989, 1993) laboratory studies of the relation between aging and 
TUTs did not consider task-related interference when probing older adults’ thoughts, but such thoughts might 
be construed by subjects as task related. Thus, the old adults may have classified these intrusions as on task, 
artificially lowering their self-reported TUT rates. Further research should therefore explore the interplay 
among executive-control processes, the cuing of current concerns, and task-related interference in both younger 
and older adults. 
 
The Default Network: Generating Competition to On-Task Thoughts 
We have argued that individual and contextual variation in mind wandering is affected by executive-control 
capabilities and by the extent to which individuals and contexts will generate potentially interfering thoughts 
about current concerns (Klinger, 1971, 2009). Consistent with this argument, neuroimaging studies have 
identified several regions of the brain, labeled the default network, that may represent ongoing mental processes 
independent of the cur-rent task set (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). 
These brain areas show heightened activity during rest, or ostensibly taskless, periods and substantial task-
induced deactivation (i.e., activity reduction that occurs at the onset of cognitive tasks). We suggest that the 
basic function of the default network is to continuously evaluate life goals and discrepancies and that it 
automatically generates the content of mind-wandering episodes (see also Klinger, 2009). Our claim, that the 
contents of mind-wandering episodes are generated as the default (automatically and inversely related to 
executive-control areas of the brain), contradicts the executive-resource-demanding view of mind wandering 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
 
Buckner and Carroll (2007) proposed that the default network is responsible for self-projection—mentally 
transporting oneself into alternate times, locations, or perspectives—as manifested in episodic memory, 
navigation, prospection (i.e., anticipating future events), and theory of mind (taking another’s perspective). We 
note that self-projection is also a core concept in Singer’s (1968; Singer & Singer, 2006) seminal theory of 
daydreaming. Specifically, as the developmental descendent of imaginative play, day-dreaming allows self-
projection into alternative pasts and futures (see also Klinger, 1971). Bar (2007; Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & 
Fenske, 2007) had similarly attributed self-projection to the default network, but he also described the processes 
by which self-projection occurs and suggests a reason for their representing a default mode of activity. Default-
mode processes run continuously in response to external and internal cues. Incoming information activates 
associations (semantic and episodic representations) generated from past experiences. These associations are 
updated by new information (memory integration or consolidation) and are used to generate predictions about 
future events. When incoming information is incongruent with activated associations, default-network processes 
generate analogies that can be used to make new predictions. Thus, the predictions continuously generated by 
the default network guide people’s thoughts, behaviors, and perceptions. 
 
The self-projection function of the default network and its outcomes (i.e., associations, analogies, and 
predictions) help explain the continuous, and sometimes interfering, nature of default processing. If the ultimate 
goal of human cognition is to under-stand and adapt to changing environments, then our default function should 
assimilate incoming information and predict the future in relation to our pressing goals. This proposal is clearly 
consistent with Klinger’s (1971, 1999, 2009) theory that cues in the environment activate thoughts about our 
current concerns. Our active, most accessible goals are both primed and modified by new information and they 
help generate associations, analogies, and predictions. 
 
The default network has also been implicated directly in mind wandering (McGuire, Paulesu, Frackowiak, & 
Frith, 1996; McKiernan et al., 2006), in that the default network is especially active when subjects report TUTs. 
For example, Mason et al. (2007) found that task-induced deactivations in several default-network regions 
correlated significantly (rs > .50) with subjects’ general retrospective reports of mind-wandering propensity 
(i.e., frequent mind wanderers showed less default-mode deactivation than infrequent mind wanderers). Mason 
et al. suggested that mind wandering reflects periodic thought intrusion via the default net-work. According to 
our view, thoughts from abstract levels of construal will intrude when executive systems fail to maintain 
proactive control. Mind wandering thus represents a return to a default state of mind (Klinger, 1971, 2009), 
whereby thoughts are generated automatically and without constraint. This claim is in conflict with Smallwood 
and Schooler’s (2006) view that mind wandering requires resources.3 
 
Neuroimaging evidence for our view that the executive-control system exerts influence over the generation of 
TUTs (i.e., over the default network) comes from Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, and Woldorff (2006). They 
found trial-by-trial trade-offs between control areas of the brain and the default network. Reductions in 
attention-control-area activity (e.g., in dorsolateral PFC) reliably predicted lapses of attention (i.e., very long 
reaction times) in a local–global selective attention task. Moreover, the default network showed heightened 
activity during these attention-lapse trials (for similar results from other attention tasks, see Eichele et al., 2008; 
Li, Yan, Bergquist, & Sinha, 2007). These results, together with research showing that executive and default 
networks are anticorrelated (see Buckner et al., 2008), are consistent with our view that executive control limits 
the entrance of TUTs into consciousness by implementing the proper level of construal (Watkins, 2008). 
Moreover, communication between the executive-control areas of the brain and the default network should vary 
with individual differences in mind-wandering propensity. As we already noted, people with ADHD mind 
wander more often than do controls (Shaw & Giambra, 1993), and a recent study revealed abnormalities in the 
functional connectivity of circuits connecting the default and executive control networks in a sample of 
individuals with ADHD (Castellanos et al., 2008). Indeed, Castellanos et al. (2008) argued that the increased 
incidence of mind wandering in people with ADHD is due to insufficient neural communication between the 
executive-control and default net-works. 
 
Although considerable evidence supports the claim that default and executive-control networks oppose one 
another (see also Fox et al., 2005; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003), a recent study by Christoff et al. 
(2009) reported evidence that is inconsistent with this claim. They conducted an fMRI study in which subjects 
were scanned as they completed a primary task (a go/ no-go task) and responded to thought probes. Each time 
subjects reported having an off-task thought they were asked to rate their awareness of it. Christoff et al. found 
that executive-control regions, including PFC and ACC, were especially activated preceding trials on which 
subjects reported TUTs. Moreover, PFC and ACC activity was stronger during mind wandering without 
awareness than with awareness. 
 
These data appear to indicate that mind wandering requires executive resources (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), 
but we favor another interpretation. Christoff et al. (2099) acknowledged that executive-control activity during 
TUTs may reflect conflict detection (ACC) or the subsequent initiation of control processes (PFC) to refocus 
attention. They argued against this possibility, however. If executive-control networks were involved in the 
return to task-oriented thought, then they should have been more active during mind wandering with awareness 
than without. This is a sensible argument, but we counter it with the following: (a) When subjects are unaware 
of their mind wandering, they may require even more control activity to bring their thoughts back on track, 
leading to an increase in PFC and ACC activity during TUTs without awareness; (b) unconscious monitoring 
processes may be responsible for tracking and redirecting one’s thoughts, as argued by Wegner (1994) and 
Schooler (2002); thus, awareness of mind wandering may be unnecessary for triggering executive control. We 
suggest that an important test of the Christoff et al. and Smallwood and Schooler (2006) claim will be to 
compare executive-control-network activity during unconstrained thought (i.e., rest) and during off-task mind 
wandering in the same group of subjects. If generating and maintaining mind-wandering episodes requires 
executive resources, then those resources should be used regardless of whether there is a competing primary 
task: Executive-control structures should be especially, and similarly, active during restful thought and during 
TUTs. If, however, executive-control areas are only active in service of redirecting thoughts back toward the 
task, they should be active only during TUTs and not during unconstrained thought or rest. 
 
Are Default-Network (and Mind-Wandering) Processes Resource Free? 
We recognize that some functions attributed to the default network (e.g., Bar, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; 
Buckner et al., 2008) seem complex and potentially resource demanding. On the one hand, we argue that mind 
wandering taps into an ongoing and automatically generated stream of thought originating in the de-fault 
network. On the other hand, we attribute complex functions to the same neural system. This discrepancy is more 
apparent than real. We do not claim that all default-network activity reflects mind wandering. Rather, default-
mode functions may sometimes be brought under conscious control and directed in a top-down manner. We 
posit, however, that bottom-up, environmentally cued processes of the default network continue without 
conscious direction, automatically generating thoughts that sometimes enter awareness as mind-wandering 
episodes. Evidence for this type of automatic processing comes from other, seemingly complex, cognitive 
phenomena, such as autobiographical memory retrieval. 
 
Involuntary autobiographical memories are representations from personal experience that enter awareness in the 
absence of any attempt at conscious retrieval and without any obvious relation to ongoing activities. Thus, many 
of these memories can be classified as TUTs. With some care, the retrieval of autobiographical memories can 
often be traced to environmental cues (Ball & Little, 2006), just as many mind-wandering episodes can (e.g., 
Klinger, 1999). Of importance to our theoretical perspective, these involuntary memories are retrieved through 
an automatic and effortless direct retrieval process (Conway & Pleydall-Pierce, 2000), also known as ecphoric 
retrieval (Moscovitch, 1994). Ecphoric retrieval occurs as a rapid and obligatory interaction between cue and 
memory, such that no controlled or strategic search process is initiated. Relevant behavioral evidence comes 
from subjective reports of the retrieval process and from evidence that retrieval time occurs in less than 2 s after 
cuing (controlled searches of autobiographical memory generally take 2–5 s; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Haque & 
Conway, 2001; Mace, 2006). Evidence from neuroscience further indicates two dissociable pathways that are 
involved in accessing autobiographical memories: a top-down search process initiated in left frontal cortex and 
a bottom-up spread of activation from medial temporal cortex (Miyashita, 2004). The bottom-up spread of 
activation is consistent with our claim that mind-wandering content is automatically and continuously 
generated. 
 
Involuntary, automatic memory retrieval is not unique to auto-biographical representations of the past. Semantic 
memories for facts and song lyrics (Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004), as well as rehearsals of prospective 
memories (Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007), also pop into mind without conscious, directed retrieval (see also the 
resolution of tip-of-the tongue states; A. S. Brown, 1991). These examples of automatic retrieval may reflect 
periodic conscious intrusions from a continuous process of goal evaluation that otherwise occurs outside of 
awareness. When these intrusions reach awareness, people experience them as mind wandering. 
 
Conclusions 
We have introduced a new perspective on the role of executive control on mind wandering by integrating the 
empirical evidence presented by Smallwood and Schooler (2006) with the theoretical perspectives offered by 
Watkins (2008) in his elaborated control theory and by Klinger (1971, 1999, 2009) in his current concerns 
theory. We argue that mind wandering represents, in part, a failure of executive control, rather than a drain on 
executive resources. The occurrence of mind wandering is dually determined by the presence and urgency of 
automatically generated, personal-goal-related thoughts (from the default-mode brain network) in response to 
cues in the external and internal environment, as well as the ability—or inability—of the executive-control 
system to de-fend primary-task performance against interference from these thoughts. 
 
Notes: 
1 We accept the possibility, however, that after the initial hijacking of attention, an individual may choose to 
exert control over the new train of thought, thereby reestablishing the primary task at the time and potentially 
using resources to continue it. An individual’s primary goal is not necessarily defined by the experimenter in a 
laboratory; she may choose to intentionally think about other things (see the tune-out vs. zone-out distinction in 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
 
2 In a reanalysis of data from McVay and Kane (2009), we found that, like TUTs, instances of TRI predicted in-
the-moment errors. Accuracy rates on rare no-go trials in a go/no-go task were lower following TRI than 
following on-task thoughts (Ms = .66 and .45 for on-task and TRI, respectively), t(233) = 11.69. 
 
3 Returning briefly to our discussion of older adults and mind wandering, Damoiseaux et al. (2008) reported a 
paucity of activity in the default network during periods of rest (when there is no specific task) in older adults 
compared to younger adults. This finding is consistent with our claim that older adults may be generating fewer 
off-task thoughts to compete with on-task thinking in the laboratory, resulting in their overall lower rates of 
mind wandering versus younger adults. 
 
References 
Antrobus, J. S. (1968). Information theory and stimulus-independent thought. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 
423–430. 
Antrobus, J. S., Coleman, R., & Singer, J. L. (1967). Signal-detection performance by subjects differing in 
predisposition to daydreaming. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 31, 487–491. 
Antrobus, J. S., Singer, J. L., & Greenberg, S. (1966). Studies in the stream of consciousness: Experimental 
suppression of spontaneous cognitive processes. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 23, 399 –417. 
Baddeley, A. (1986). Working memory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Ball, C. T., & Little, J. C. (2006). A comparison of involuntary autobiographical memory retrievals. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 20, 1167– 1179. 
Bar, M. (2007). The proactive brain: Using analogies and associations to generate predictions. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11, 280–289. 
Bar, M., Aminoff, E., Mason, M., & Fenske, M. (2007). The units of thought. Hippocampus, 17, 420–428. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency and control in social 
cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (pp. 1–40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Barkley, R. A. (1997). Behavioral inhibition, sustained attention, and executive functions: Constructing a 
unifying theory of AD/HD. Psycho-logical Bulletin, 121, 65–94. 
Beilock, S. L. (2008). Math performance in stressful situations. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
17, 339–343. 
Berntsen, D., & Hall, N. M. (2004). The episodic nature of involuntary autobiographical memories. Memory & 
Cognition, 32, 789–803. Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. 
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108, 624–652. 
Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of working memory 
variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In A. R. A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. J. Kane, A. Miyake, & J. 
N. Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 76–106). New York, NY: Oxford University Press 
Braver, T. S., & West, R. (2008). Working memory, executive control, and aging. In F. I. M. Craik & T. A. 
Salthouse (Eds.), The handbook of aging 
and cognition (3rd ed., pp. 311–372). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Brown, A. S. (1991). A review of the 
tip-of-the-tongue experience. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 203–223. 
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005, February 18). Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior 
cingulate cortex. Science, 18, 1118 –1121.  
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain’s default network: Anatomy, 
function, and relevance to disease. Annuals of the New York Academy of Science, 1124, 1–38. 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 49–57. 
Carstensen, L. L. (1993). Motivation for social contact across the life span: A theory of socio-emotional 
selectivity. In J. Jacobs (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 40. Developmental perspectives on 
motivation (pp. 209–254). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. 
Carstensen, L. L. (1995). Evidence for a life-span theory of socioemotional selectivity. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 4, 151–156. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1999). Themes and issues in the self-regulation of behavior. In R. S. Wyer 
(Ed.), Perspectives on behavioral self-regulation (pp. 1–105). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Castellanos, F., Margulies, D., Kelly, C., Uddin, L., Ghaffari, M., Kirsch, A., .. . Biswal, B. (2008). Cingulate-
precuneus interactions: A new locus of dysfunction in adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Biological 
Psychiatry, 63, 332–337. 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Experience sampling during 
fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to mind wandering. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, USA, 26, 8719 – 8724. 
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-
memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261–288. 
Damoiseaux, J. S., Smith, S. M., Witter, M. P., Sanz-Arigita, E. J., Barkhof, F., Scheltens, P., ... & Rombouts, 
S. (2008). White matter tract integrity in aging and Alzheimer’s disease. Human Brain Mapping, 30, 1051–
1059. 
Eichele, T., Debener, S., Calhoun, V. D., Specht, K., Engel, A. K., Hugdahl, K., . . . Ullsperger, M. (2008). 
Prediction of human errors by maladaptive changes in event-related brain networks. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, USA, 105, 6173– 6178. 
Engle, R. W., & Kane, M. J. (2004). Executive attention, working memory capacity, and a two factor theory of 
cognitive control. In B. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 145–199). New York, NY: 
Academic Press. 
Filler, M. S., & Giambra, L. M. (1973). Daydreaming as a function of cueing and task difficulty. Perceptual 
and Motor Skills, 37, 503–509. 
Finnigan, F., Schulze, D., & Smallwood, J. (2007). Alcohol and the wandering mind: A new direction in the 
study of alcohol on attentional lapses. International Journal on Disability and Human Development, 6, 189–
199. 
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2009). Harnessing the wandering mind: The role of perceptual load. Cognition, 111, 
345–355. 
Fox, M. D., Snyder, A. Z., Vincent, J. L., Corbetta, M., Van Essen, D. C., & Raichle, M. E. (2005). The human 
brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional networks. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, USA, 102, 9673–9678. 
Giambra, L. M. (1977–1978). Adult male daydreaming across the life span: A replication, further analyses, and 
tentative norms based upon retrospective reports. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 8, 
197–228. 
Giambra, L. M. (1979–1980). Sex differences in daydreaming and related mental activity from the late teens to 
the early nineties. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 10, 1–34. 
Giambra, L. M. (1989). Task-unrelated thought frequency as a function of age: A laboratory study. Psychology 
and Aging, 4, 136 –143. 
Giambra, L. M. (1993). The influence of aging on spontaneous shifts of attention from external stimuli to the 
contents of consciousness. Experimental Gerontology, 28, 485–492. 
Giambra, L. M. (1995). A laboratory method for investigating influences on switching attention to task-
unrelated imagery and thought. Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 1–21. 
Greicius, M. D., Krasnow, B., Reiss, A. L., & Menon, V. (2003). Functional connectivity in the resting brain: A 
network analysis of the default mode hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 100, 
253–258. 
Grodsky, A., & Giambra, L. M. (1990–1991). The consistency across vigilance and reading tasks of individual 
differences in the occurrence of task-unrelated and task-related images and thoughts. Imagination, Cognition 
and Personality, 10, 39–52. 
Haque, S., & Conway, M. A. (2001). Sampling the process of autobiographical memory construction. European 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 13, 529–547. 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 108, 356 –388. 
Hess, T. M., Auman, C., Colcombe, S. J., & Rahhal, T. A. (2003). The impact of stereotype threat on age 
differences in memory performance. Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 58, P3–P11. 
Horowitz, M. J., & Becker, S. S. (1971). Cognitive response to stress and experimental demand. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 78, 86–92. 
Horowitz, M. J., Becker, S. S., & Moskowitz, M. L. (1971). Intrusive and repetitive thought after stress: A 
replication study. Psychological Re-ports, 29, 763–767. 
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. (2007). For whom the 
mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study of working memory and executive control in daily life. 
Psychological Science, 18, 614–621. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working-memory capacity and the control of attention: The contributions 
of goal neglect, response com-petition, and task set to Stroop interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 132, 47–70. 
Karatekin, C. (2004). A test of the integrity of the components of Baddeley’s model of working memory in 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45, 912–926. 
Klinger, E. (197 1). Structure and functions of fantasy. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Klinger, E. (1999). Thought flow: Properties and mechanisms underlying shifts in content. In J. A. Singer & P. 
Salovey (Eds.), At play in the fields of consciousness: Essays in honor of Jerome L. Singer (pp. 29–50). 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Klinger, E. (2009). Daydreaming and fantasizing: Thought flow and motivation. In K. D. Markman, W. M. P. 
Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of imagination and mental simulation (pp. 225–239). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Klos, D. S., & Singer, J. L. (1981). Determinants of the adolescents’ ongoing thought following simulated 
parental confrontations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 975–987. 
Kvavilashvili, L., & Fisher, L. (2007). Is time-based prospective remembering mediated by self-initiated 
rehearsals? Role of incidental cues, ongoing activity, age, and motivation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 136, 112–132. 
Kvavilashvili, L., & Mandler, G. (2004). Out of one’s mind: A study of involuntary semantic memories. 
Cognitive Psychology, 48, 47–94. 
Li, C. R., Yan, P., Bergquist, K. L., & Sinhaa, R. (2007). Greater activation of the ―default‖ brain regions 
predicts stop signal errors. NeuroImage, 38, 640–648. 
MacDonald, A. W., III, Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2000, June 9). Dissociating the role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex in cognitive control. Science, 288, 1835–1838. 
Mace, J. H. (2006). Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: Demonstrating 
involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task. Memory, 14, 917–924. 
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1989). Toward a motivational and structural theory of ruminative thought. In J. S. 
Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 306–326). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1996). Some ruminative thoughts. In R. S. Wyer Jr. (Ed.), Ruminative thoughts (pp. 
1–47). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C. N. (2007, January 
19). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent thought. Science, 19, 393– 395. 
McGuire, P. K., Paulesu, E., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1996). Brain activity during stimulus 
independent thought. NeuroReport, 7, 2095–2099. 
McKiernan, K. A., D’Angelo, B. R., Kaufman, J. N., & Binder, J. R. (2006). Interrupting the stream of 
consciousness: An fMRI investigation. NeuroImage, 29, 1185–1191. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: Working memory capacity, goal neglect, 
and mind-wandering in an executive-control task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 35, 196–204. 
Mitchell, J. P., Heatherton, T. F., Kelley, W. M., Wyland, C. L., Wegner, D. M., & Macrae, C. N. (2007). 
Separating sustained from transient aspects of cognitive control during thought suppression. Psychological 
Science, 18, 292–297. 
Miyashita, Y. (2004, October 15). Cognitive memory: Cellular and net-work machineries and their top-down 
control. Science, 306, 435–440. 
Moscovitch, M. (1994). Cognitive resources and dual-task interference effects at retrieval in normal people: The 
role of the frontal lobes and medial temporal cortex. Neuropsychology, 8, 524–534. 
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and the depletion of limited resources: Does self-
control resemble a muscle? Psycho-logical Bulletin, 126, 247–259. 
Parks, C. W., & Klinger, E., & Perlmutter, M. (1988–1989). Dimensions of thought as a function of age, gender 
and task difficulty. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 8, 49–62. 
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In R. Solso (Ed.), Information 
processing & cognition: The Loyola symposia (pp. 55–85). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., & Shulman, G. L. (2001). A 
default mode of brain function. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 98, 676–682. 
Sarason, I. G., Pierce, G. R., & Sarason, B. R. (1996). Cognitive interference: Theories, methods, and findings. 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Sayette, M. A., Reichle, E. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Lost in the sauce: The effects of alcohol on mind 
wandering. Psychological Science, 20, 747–752. 
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Rerepresenting consciousness: Dissociations between experience and meta-
consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 339–344. 
Schooler, J. W., Reichle, E. D., & Halpern, D. V. (2004). Zoning out while reading: Evidence for dissociations 
between experience and metaconsciousness. In D. Levin (Ed.), Thinking and seeing: Visual metacognition in 
adults and children (pp. 203–226). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Shallice, T., Marzocchi, G. M., Coser, S., Del Savio, M., Meuter, R. F., & Rumiati, R. I. (2002). Executive 
function profile of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Developmental Neuropsychology, 21, 
43–71. 
Shaw, G. A., & Giambra, L. M. (1993). Task unrelated thoughts of college students diagnosed as hyperactive in 
childhood. Developmental Neuropsychology, 9, 17–30. 
Singer, J. L. (1968). The importance of daydreaming. Psychology Today, 1, 18–27. 
Singer, J. L., & Singer, D. G. (2006). Preschoolers’ imaginative play as precursor of narrative consciousness. 
Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 25, 97–117. 
Smallwood, J., Davies, J. B., Heim, D., Finnigan, F., Sudberry, M. V., O’Connor, R. C., & Obonsawain, M. C. 
(2004). Subjective experience 
and the attentional lapse. Task engagement and disengagement during sustained attention. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 4, 657–690. 
Smallwood, J., Heim, D., Riby, L., & Davies, J. D. (2005). Encoding during the attentional lapse: Accuracy of 
encoding during the semantic SART. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 218 –23 1. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2007). The lights are on but no one’s home: Meta-
awareness and the decoupling of attention when the mind wanders. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 527–
533. Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). When attention matters: The curious incident of 
the wandering mind. Memory & Cognition, 36, 1144–1150. 
Smallwood, J., Obonsawin, M. C., & Heim, S. D. (2003). Task unrelated thought: The role of distributed 
processing. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 169–189. 
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., & Heim, D. (2006). Rumination, dysphoria, and subjective experience. 
Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 24, 355–367. 
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 946–958. 
Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1988). Drinking your troubles away: II. An attention-allocation model of 
alcohol’s effect on psychological stress. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 196–205. 
Stuvyen, E., & van der Gouten, K. (1995). Stimulus-independent thought and working memory: The role of the 
central executive. Psychologica Belgica, 35, 241–251. 
Teasdale, J. D., Dritschel, B. H., Taylor, M. J., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Baddeley, A. D. 
(1995). Stimulus-independent thought depends on central executive resources. Memory & Cognition, 23, 551–
559. 
Teasdale, J. D., Lloyd, C. A., Proctor, L., & Baddeley, A. (1993). Working memory and stimulus-independent 
thought: Effects of memory load and presentation rate. European Journal of Psychology, 5, 417–433. 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they’re doing? Action identification and 
human behavior. Psychological Re-view, 94, 3–15. 
Watkins, E. R. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 163–
206. 
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34–52. 
Weissman, D. H., Roberts, K. C., Visscher, K. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2006). The neural bases of momentary 
lapses in attention. Nature Neuroscience 9, 971–978. 
